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In 1968 the United States saw the development of a 
political movement which provided hope for millions of 
people, while instilling fear in as many others. George 
C. Wallace, populist governor of Alabama, was challenging 
an old American institution--the two-party system. Theodore 
Roosevelt, Eugene Debs, Norman Thomas, Henry Wallace and 
Strom Thurmond had all failed at the same endeavor, but 
Wallace convinced much of the nation that he had a good 
chance to tie up the electoral college and wring political . ,  
concessions from both major parties. 
The Wallace vote in the South could be explained as the 
very practical attempt to gain bargaining power for a region 
struggling . . to'maintain its political footho1.d. It is harder 
to explain why many non-Southerners were willing to bolt the' 
'two-party system and waste their vote on someone who had no 
chance of winning their state's electoral votes, or the. 
election. The Wallace voter outside the South could only 
hope for an indirect effect in the unspecified future by 
enticing the major parties to pay him more attention. Whether 
motivated by rational deferred gratification or self-expression 
for its own sake, these voters were acting more as protesters 
than as participants in the conventional political system. In 
a sense, voting for Wallace in Illinois is more of a protest 
than voting Communist in Italy or France, where the Communist 
parties are well-woven into the political fabric and where 
such parties participate in coalitions. 
Political protest is usually treated in one of three 
ways: (1) voting within the political party system for the 
party of change, (2) nonparticipation in politics, and 
(3) participating in political-oriented violence. Our 
concern here is with something that fits into none of these 
categories, namely voting within the established electoral 
system for a candidate outside of the established party system. 
Taking after Durkheim, much of political sociology has 
conceived of society as an organism which is sometimes diseased. 
The general hypothesis is that large-scale social changes- lead 
to strains in society which find expression in political 
protest. This is how Parsons explained the rise of the 
fascist movement in Germany (Parsons, 1942), the McCarthy 
movement of the fifties (1964a), and the radical right in 
the early sixties (1964b). He failed to specify the mechanisms 
by which this occurs, and his approach is somewhat mysterious 
for that reason. Fortunately, some of his followers are more. 
specific (see Smelser, 1963). 
Theorists have focused on many different societal changes 
as sources of social strain, including change per - se (Hoffer, 
1951); differentiation (Eisenstadt, 1966:31); increased com- 
munication and alienation from the means of production (Marx, 
1959, especially p. 18); rationalization (Parsons, 1942); 
affluence(Schurnpeter, 1962; Inglehart, 1971; Segal and Felson, 
1970) ; technological change (Ogburn, 1922.) ; and urbanization-- 
particularly size, density and heterogeneity of the population . 
(Wirth, 1938). Social historians have supplied a list of 
catchy terms for these changes--the industrial revolution, 
-3- 
technological revolution, vital revolution, capitalist revolu- 
tion, etc.. Recently, Hauser (1969) merged the Ogburn and 
Wirth perspectives into what he called the "social morphological 
revolution." 
Social scientists have also been somewhat creative, .if 
less sloganistic, in discussing intermediate variables between 
social change and political protest. Some have emphasized the 
ways in which societal changes cause individuals to suffer 
psychological strains (Hoffer, 1951; Johnson, 1966). Others 
have treated the social stratification system as the locus 
of social strain: social change either deprives men of.some 
crucial social reward, or catalyzes cleavages for which the 
potential has always existed. Segal and Felson (1970) . suggest . 
that affluence enhances conflict because it places greater 
resources in the hands of conflict groups. Following Tocqueville 
(1955), Gurr (1968) concludes that social change engenders 
rising expectations, relative deprivation, hence revolution. 
Eisenstadt (1966:22, 122) reasons that the increasing inter- 
dependence of groups arising from differentiation intensifies 
their impingement on each other, thereby contributing to 
political protest. In a similar vein, Bell (1964) attributes 
the growth of the American radical right in the early sixties 
to the displacement of old elitesby new ones, while Tilly (1969) 
explains collective violence as ,the result of competition among 
groups gaining, maintaining, or losing their position in the 
polity. Marx (1959) attributes the demise of capitalism partly 
to the restructuring of social contacts and communication in 
capitalist society, which leads the proletariat to discover 
its objective interest and to organize. On the other hand, 
Trotsky (1959:9) suggests that deracinated peasants who 
become urban workers are more likely to break with the past 
than the established proletariat. Hauser asserts that the 
. . 
social-morphological revolution leads to "the chaotic society" 
by enhancing ecalogical competition (from Park, 1936) ,, and 
by intensifying moral-density (from Durkheim, 1964). 
Another way in which social change may lead to political 
disruption is by increasing status inconsistency of individuals. 
Assuming that individuals high on one status and low on another 
status undergo personal strains, they may be more likely to 
participate in political protest of the left. (Lenski, 1954) 
or of the right (Rush, 1967; Hunt and Cushing, 1971). The 
concept of status inconsistency .has been applied not only to 
individuals, but also to occupational groups (Hodge, 1962); 
hations in their international relations (Tanter, 1969) ; and ' 
societies in their aggregate reward systems (Galtung, ,1964; 
Woelfel, '1970; Sorokin, 1947). Galtung theorizes that. 
societies in which education grows faster than the job 
. . 
market for educated people will be plagued by revolution. 
One can answer the general hypothesis that some changes 
lead to political protest with the counter-hypothesis that 
other changes reduce strain, hence mit'iga'te revolutionary 
tendencies. Bell (1960) and Lane (1965) have predicted an 
age of consensus deriving from the equalization of material 
. . 
rewards. Current events have been very unkind to their 
prophecy, but it is as yet unclear whether their analytical 
- 
error was claiming a decline in inequality or assuming that 
inequality was the prime source of political protest. Some 
theorists consider the status inconsistency of individuals 
:to be quite conducive to societal stability, because it allows 
almost everyone to be privileged in some respect, thereby 
.. . 
: . .  
- - -  . -preventing the formation of coherent conflict groups (see 
. . . -  . . . . . . . 
Wiley, 1967; Dahrendorf, 1959; Simmel, 1964; Landecker, 1970). 
OBJECT OF THIS STUDY 
This study cannot directly test any of the broad theories 
mentioned--if indeed any study could do that. Rather, we wili 
derive from several of these theories some rather concrete 
hypotheses about one specific type of political protest: 
. , . . '  the support for George Wallace in the 1968 electio'n. We will 
not directly measure any of the assertions about the.recruit- 
ment of specific individuals to protest movements, or about 
the behavior of total societies in the course of history. Our 
purpose is much more modest: to study the level of support for 
one movement at one point in time across several American 
" 
communities which are presumed to be at different stages of 
social development. Our inferences from the data must be more 
limited than the theories reviewed. 
. . We .hypothesize that population increase, immigration, 
affluence, bureaucratization and social inequality will all be 
positively related to the level of support for Wallace on a 
district level. We expect that self-employment will be 
negatively related to the Wallace vote; in other words, 
alienation from the means of production should be positively 
. . . . 
related.to political protest. Finally,. we' expect that those 
: , .  districts whose education outruns income or white-collar 
employment will generate greater support for Wallace. 
The social basis of the Wallace vote hqs already been 
\ studied to some extent by political sociologists. Eitzen f 
(1970) found a relationship between status inconsistency of . . 
individuals and support for Wallace. Segal and Schoenberger 
(1970) found that Southern congressional districts. with more 
Negroes tended to generate more support for Wallace. Our . . 
paper will' follow their lead in investigating aggregate affects. 
. . 
' .  THE DATA 
. . 
We obtained' census data, on Congressional diqtricts from. ' ' . . . 
the Congressional District Data Book (Districts of' the 88th 
. . 
Congress) and merged this with the 1968 election returns . . . . 
published in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 
'-. -.: Excluded from anazysis were all Southern and Border.states 
(among them, Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma,.Tennessee, West . 
Virginia), leaving only those states which wallace had no 
chance of'winning. We,then excluded all districts which 
had substantially redistricted since 1960, since' stable 
boundaries were necessary for measuring change. In all, . . 
. ' 172 districts were included in our sample. * The mean Wallace 
vote for the districts studied was 8 . 2 % ,  with a standard 
deviation of 5.5%. While our sample from all congressional . . 
districts was non-random, our sample is the total population 
of stable non-Southern districts, minus a few with missing 
data cases. We shall consider election day in 172 districts 
in 1968 to be a random sample from an infinite number of 
conceivable election days for districts, applying statistical 
. tests accordingly. 
Measurement and sampling error aside, a difference of 
a few percentage points in Wallace vote was important for its 
psychological impact, which depended on winning a noticeable 
minority rather than a majority. 
. . DATA ANALYSIS 
The most basic hypothesis abstracted from the literature 
is that societal change leads to political protest. We used 
two measures of change for each district: (I) the percentage 
population increase between the 1950 and 1960 censuses, and 
(2) the percentage of the population in 1960 that had migrated 
from outside the district since 1955, including immigrants to 
the United States and migrants from other districts. These 
changes took place eight years prior to the 1968 election, and 
were the most recent data available. 
As Table 1 shows, population increase and in-migration 
before 1960 are both related to the Wallace vote in 1968 
(r=.170 and .I56 respectively). These findings are in the 
direction predicted, but quite modest. Regressing the Wallace 
Table 1 about here 
vote on both of these measures of change explained 3.64% 
of the variance in district Wallace vote.3 while the data 
are consistent with the functionalist interpretation of 
social protest, they do not support the all-embracing determin- 
ism which one sometimes finds in the literature. 
Population change, in-migration, education, income and 
per cent white collar all tend to cluster together, as 
expected (see Table 1). Similarly, self-employment is 
negatively related to all of these, save in-migration. 
Contrary to Parsons' perspective, no relationship was 
found between bureaucratization (per cent white collar) and 
support for Wallace, at the zero-order level. As one would , 
predict from a semi-Marxist perspective, there is more support 
for Wallace in districts which have greater alienation from 
the means of production, that is less self-employment (r=.116). 4 
As predicted from Schumpeter, Inglehart, as well as Segal and 
Felson, but contrary to the perspective of Lane and Bell, there 
is a positive relationship between the 1968 vote for Wallace 
and the median income of the district (r=.130). I> 
~he'next step is to investigate the functions and dys- 
functions of inequality. We measured income inequality by 
computing the standard deviation by income for each district. 
However, a standard deviation of $500 is socially more signifi- 
cant in districts which have a mean income of $4,000 than in 
districts with a mean income of $8,000. Therefore, our index 
of income inequality was standardized by dividing the standard . 
deviation by the mean, to give us the coefficient of variability 
for each district.6 The same procedure was followed using 
years of education to give us a measure of educational inequal- 
ity for each district. The zero-order relationship between 
income inequality and the Wallace vote (r=.089) is in the . 
opposite direction predicted and is neither statistically 
significant nor large enough for us to claim a serendipitous 
discovery. The high negative correlation between income , 
inequality and median income (-.841) indicates that increased 
affluence relates to increased equality. The multicollinearity 
is too great to regress the Wallace vote on both variables at 
the same time, but it does appear that income inequality has 
little relation to the Wallace vote. Contrarywise, educatibnal 
inequality has a relatively strong zero-order relationship to 
. . 
7 the Wallace vote (r=.244) which is significant at the .005 
level. We find that the more educationally advantaged districts 
tend to have less . educational inequality (r=-. 542) . Regressing 
Wallace vote on both median education and the inequality index 
enhances the impact of the latter (standardized beta = .347). 
It appears that status inequality, but not income inequality, 
was related to political protest in 1968, in line with 
Hofstadter's (1964) view that status politics replace class 
politics in modern industrial society. 
So far we have concentrated on the relationship between 
social change, vertical stratification and the Wallace vote. 
.. . We will now turn to a brief investigation of status inconsistency 
on an ecological level. Our data do not tell us how many 
individuals in a district are status inconsistent. But we can 
measure whether the average'income, occupation, and education 
levels are discrepant. The distributions over districts of 
median years of schooling and median income were divided 
into quartiles and crosstabulated. A district was coded 
consistent if it fell in the same quartile on both variables. 
Two distinct types of inconsistency were coded--that in which 
income was in a higher quartile than education and that in 
which education was in a higher quartile than income. The 
same procedure was followed in coding inconsistencies between 
level of education and level of white-collar employment. Analy- 
sis of variance was performed to uncover differences between 
consistent and inconsistent districts. Panel A in Table 2 
1 h 
shows a small, statistically significant relationship between 
P 
Wallace vote and the inconsistency between education and income, 
with a slightly higher level of Wallace vote in districts where 
income surpasses education. Panel B shows a slightly higher 
average Wallace vote in districts where education outruns 
white-collar employment, but again fails to achieve statistical 
significance. The data do not establish any clear relationship 
between macro-status inconsistency and the vote for Wallace. 
Table 2 about here 
To summarize the findings so far, the level of -Wallace 
support was found to be positively related to population 
change, in-migration, median income, per cent white collar, 
and educational inequality; negatively related to per cent 
self-employed; unrelated to income inequality and to macro-status 
inconsistency of two types. 
We could not partial out the effects of each and every 
sociological variable because of multicollinearity. However, 
we were able to partial out the effects of race, education 
and income. Wallace support is predicted by fewer Negroes 
(b*=-.104), less education (b*=-.141), and higher income 
(b*=.205). In all, 3.6% of the variance in Wallace vote is 
explained by these three independent variables. 
Numerous regression equations were computed using various 
combinations of independent variables. Two variables emerged 
as the strongest predictors of the Wallace vote, controlling 
for any and all of the other variables--the per cent population 
change and the amount of educational inequality. One might 
think that social change leads to protest through the inter- 
vening variable of educational inequality, but most of the 
measures associated with social change were negatively related 
to educational inequality. Multiple regression (see Table 3) 
reveals that one standard deviation in population change 
yields about one-fourth of a standard deviation in Wallace 
vote (b*=.275), while one standard deviation in educational 
inequality yields about one-third of a standard deviation -in 
Wallace vote (b*=.332). These two variables together account 
for 12.7% of the variance in Wallace vote. None of the other 
-variables either add to or detract from the relationship of 
population change and inequality to th'e Wallace vote, as step- 
wise regression reveals (Table 3). 
Table 3 about.here 
If education, prosperity, in-migration and bureaucratiza- 
tion have an effect on the Wallace vote, this happens through 
the intermediate variables of population.-change and educational 
inequality. As the zero-order correlations in Table 1 show, 
. . 
educational inequality falls as education, income, and per 
cent white collar rise (r=-.542,-.159,-.282 respectively), an 
indication that cornmunity.growth lessens this particular 
source of social protest. On the other hand, immigration, 
education, income and bureaucratization are all positively 
related to population change. It appears that community 
qrowth and industrialization mitigate' social protest by 
diminishing social inequality, at the same time exacerbating 
social protest by some other mechanism, as yet unidentified. 
The changes which take place in modern society cut both ways 
in their effects on political protest, at least with respect 
to the support for George Wallace. 
The high intercorrelations among these independent 
variables and the lack of a clear causal order among them 
'makes it difficult to build a path model with more than a 
few of them. Figure 1 shows a theoretically reasonable model, 
assuming that population change measures community growth as 
well as demographic change. The model is supported by the 
fact that the.correlations which it predicts approximate 
those observed,l and by the fact that thescomputed correlation 
between the residuals (taking education and the- Wallace vote 
as dependent variables) was .052, close to zero. 
Table 4 about here 
The path diagram in Figure 1 illustrates the following 
. multivariate theory of social change and political protest: 
icommunity growth generates a boom in education, which reduces 
the relative inequality of education in districts. This 
reduction in inequality leads to a lower level of political 
protest. On the other hand, community growth itself increases 
political protest (in Hauser's terms, the "social morphological 
revolution" leads to "the chaotic society"). Migration to 
districts has three effects: it escalates population growth, 
hence protest; it contributes to educational inequality, 
probably by depositing a new crop of poorly-educated and very 
well-educated people in the same district; and it contributes 
to the education boom by increasing community growth, hence 
mitigating inequality and dissent. 
The model shown in Figure 1 implies that different aspects 
of social change affect society differently, canceling each 
other out to some extent. While the overall correlation 
between population change and Wallace vote is positive, its 
magnitude is not great. One might say that, while some .forces 
heat up the.po1iti.c~ of a changing society, other forces cool 
it down. On the whole there was somewhat more heating up in 
1968 than usual, insofar as third-party movements are concerned, 
Figure 1 about here 
Our investigation has failed to isolate what it is about 
community growth that increases political protest. In the 
search for intervening variables, we have eliminated those 
factors related to the material position of men in terms of 
their work (self-employment, median income, white-collar 
status, income inequality), as well as 'the educational level 
of districts. Hoffer's thesis that change itself feeds 
mass movements, Park's perspective on ecological competition, 
and Hauser's hypothesis that moral density is related to 
expression of social strain are all consistent with our 
findings. Unfortunately our data do not include the ethnic 
and racial composition of population growth, and it is 
reasonable to suspect that . group . conflict along these lines 
is an important intervening variable. Since much of Wallace's 
appeal was to race-conscious whites, it is reasonable-to 
expect that population growth helped Wallace by stirring up 
ecological competition among whites and blacks. 
To indirectly measure this, we separated out those ten 
districts with over 7% Negroes and over 18% population growth. 
These districts had a mean of 11.09% Wallace votes, 3.03% 
more than the other districts. The difference of means test, 
assuming equal variances, revealed that this difference is 
significantly greater than zero at the .05 level.. This 
statistical interaction indicates that community growth 
particularly intensifies political protest in districts which 
have many Negroes. Apparently, the relation between per cent 
Negro and the wallace vote which Schoenbergerand Segal (1970) 
observed in the South is true in the rest of the country only 
when population growth is rapid. 
. \ 
CONCLUSION 
Our data indicate that social change has its functions 
and its dysfunctions--if we take the Wallace vote as an index 
of dysfunction. On the one hand, community growth lessens 
status conflict by equalizing education. On the other hand, 
community growth prbbably enhances status conflict between. 
blacks and whites, thereby intensifying political protest. 
Table 1.--Aggregate Stratification Variables, Societal Change and the Wallace Vote 
zero-order Correlations, Means, Standard Deviations, and N's 
Data for 172 Congressional Districts 
1. . 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Mean Std. N 
Dev. 
1. % Population Change .466* .589* -655" .544* -.266# -.226# -.317* .170# 18.4 21.4 ,172 
2. % In-Migration and 159 .450* .142# .258# .085 .014 .005 .156# 8.9 6.3 159 
Immigrants 
3. Median Years 159 157 ..564* .746* -.268* -.167# -.542* .002 10.8 1.0 159 
Schooling ' 
4. Median Income 164 159 159 .806* -.043 -.608* -.159# .130# $5920 $1020 164 
5. % White Collar 172 159 159 164 -.151# -.413 -.282# .005 40.3 7.0 172 
6. % Negro 169 156 156 161 155 -.339* .468# .075 5.1 10.8 169 
7. % Self Employed 158 158 158 158 158 155 -.340# .116# 13.0 7.4 168 
8. Educational 159 159 . 159 159 -159 159 158 .244# .354 .025 169 
Inequality 
9. Wallace Vote 172 , 159 159 164 ,. 172 
. . . . . . .  
169 
. . .  
158 159 
. . . .  . . . . .  . , . , , . . .  
8.2 5.5 172 
Correlations are above the diagonal. Number of cases for each pairwise correlations is 
found below the diagonal. 
*p(.0005 one-tailed that the correlation is significantly greater than zero (or less than 
zero)., according to hypotheses derived from the literature. 
#p (-05 one tailed. 
Table 2.--Analysis of Variance of District Status 
Inconsistency and the Wallace Vote 
. . .  . . 
A. Inconsistency between Education and Income Levels 
. . . . . . . . 
Category 
. . . . 
Mean Wallace Standard 
. . Vote . - . . . . . Deviation . . 





~=0.945 not sig. 
B. Inconsistency between Education and Occupation Levels 
. . .  . , . , .  . . . .  . .  
% White Collar 
surpasses .Education 16.4 
Consistent 52.2 7.417 
. 
Level of Education 
surpasses % White 
Collar 31.4 8.996 
F=1.358 not sig. 
Table 3,--Stepwise Regression of Wallace Vote on Several Independent 
Variables: Standardized Betas and Multiple Correlations. 
~opulation Educational In- Median Median % White % Self 
Change Inequality Migration Income Education Collar. Employ. 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. R 
Table 4.--Standardized Betas Used as Path Coefficients 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables 
In- Popula- Educa- Educ.In- Multiple Residual 









1; The exclusion of districts whose boundaries had substan- 
tially. changed could have resulted in an under-representation 
of.districts which had undergone substantial population 
growth. 'This problem should not be exaggerated . . since our 
sample,contains enough variance in.population change to 
perform the desired analysis. Between 1950 and 1960, the 
mean population change of districts was +18.4%, with a 
standard deviation of 21.4%. 
2. While all of Ohio and most of New York and California were 
lost due to redistricting, several other highly industrial- 
ized states were completely represented (among them, 
Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania) . 
3 -  One could attribute the correlation between population 
change and Wallace vote to the migration of Southerners 
to non-Southern districts. However, population change is 
still related to the Wallace vote controlling . . for per cent 
in-migrants (b*='. 124) . 
4. We recognize that these data were derived from aggregating 
data. on individuals. Consequently, our aggregate correla- 
' . . tions could indicate any number of effects on an individual - level. We have no way of testing these individual-level 
interpretations, though from time to time we will make 
' some reasonable inferences. We acknowledge that controlling 
for individual-level variables might well wipe out out 
aggregate . . correlations. In fact, that would be quite 
desirable, as it would help pinpoint the mechanisms 
by which the aggregate relationships were generated. 
Our aggregate correlations are not to be interpreted as 
contextual effects, but rather the summation of individual 
effects. 
5. However, Wallace vote is related to the percentage of 
males employed as craftsmen and foremen (r=.298). This 
finding is ambiguous since craftsmen and foremen are 
about in the middle of the occupational and income status 
hierarchies. One could alternatively claim that this 
group is proletarian, advantaged, status inconsistent, 
or middle class. We have chosen to concentrate our effort 
on less ambiguous findings. 
6. The income inequality measure has a mean of :625 and a 
standard deviation of .061. 
7. One could 'argue that this effect was less related to 
standard deviation than to skewness, We tested this and 
found that districts skewed to the left (overloaded with 
poorly educated people) had slightly mork Wallace support 
and that. those skewed to the right had slightly less. The 
magnitudes of. these relationships were too small to under- 
mine the interpretation given in the text. 
8. The correlation observed between education and Wallace 
vote was .002, while the one predicted from the model was 
-.018. The observed correlation between immigration and 
Wallace vote was ,156, while the computed correlation was 
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